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Abstract: In order to make an in-depth analysis to mutual relations and multi-interest 
of the strategic investment management model in province, it utilizes the game theory, 
and researches the basic elements in the game model, which it establishes, including 
the assumptions, strategies, objectives and functions of the two players. Finally, it 
quotes the imperfect information static game model, and takes the first level sealed 
price auction game model as the quintessence to describe and analyze the game 
behavior in the strategic investment management in province, so that it can provide 
the opinion and suggestion for all the gambling players’ decision-making, meet with 
the economical globalization and the dog-eat-dog new situation, grasp the strategic 
opportunity, strengthen the management from the strategic perspective unceasingly, 
and upgrade the provincial economic development strength. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years in our nation, with the continuous mercerization evolvement of investing and financing 
system and with the gradual completion of state-owned capital operating mechanism, as the key link of 
the graded management system in national investment, the provincial government have greatly changed 
the role in the investment management, for the proportion in direct investment reducing gradually and it 
is necessary to show the strategic influence of provincial government in the process of investment 
management. 
The provincial strategic investment management is a dynamic process with the strategy and target 
being drawn up based on the change of inside and outside environment in provincial area, being taken 
charge of the whole process of execution and guaranteed the correct commitment of the purpose in order 
to promote provincial economic development. It is also can be seen as the provincial government 
carrying out a long-term、global organizing and planning activity towards investment behavior in the 
scope of jurisdiction, aiming at increasing regional investment benefits and promoting regional 
economic development. The provincial strategic investment management should embody the 
government’s guides and impetus. On one side, the government should choose pillar industry according 
to local and humane environment. In the resource industry, the government should choose the top of 
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industrial chain, namely the resource exploitation; for the other industries, the government should 
choose the end of industrial chain, which is the manufacture of finished products. In this way, the 
government can lead a better way in the investment of social capital. On the other side, after choosing 
relevant pillar industry, government needs to coordinate beneficiary relationship between government 
and investors, find out the equilibrium point on the interests for both sides and reduce direct investment, 
expecting more and investment from social capital, making the effect of levering a small investment into 
a large profit. 
The realization of provincial strategic investment management will create a new way of more 
effective resource allocation, which will take great advantage of economic resources in province, 
improve innovation ability of provincial strategic investment behavior, in addition to enhance industry 
upgrade and economical competitive advantage, thus gain the promotion of great-leap-forward 
development of provincial economic. 
This paper emphasizes on analyzing the impetus role of provincial government in provincial strategic 
investment management, which is the game research in coordinating relationship and benefits between 
government and investor, so as to establish the game model for provincial strategic investment 
management, including assumptions, strategies, objectives of the two players as well as detailed 
analytical statement of equilibrium point on the interests of both sides under different circumstance. By 
doing so, the provincial government can be guided in a more effective way in choosing under the process 
of strategic investment, in order to guide and push social capital invest, facilitate reasonable provincial 
resources configuration and economical development. 
 
2.   ASSUMPTION OF GAME PLAYERS 
 
In the economics analysis, no matter choosing which game structure for making the elementary 
description of practical economic activities, the first thing is the confirmation of game players.3 This 
paper will set game players through illustrating the behavior of both provincial government and investor, 
analyze game relationship afterwards. 
 
2.1 Assumptions of the government 
The provincial government’s work is pursuing the optimal solution of the effectiveness under specified 
constraint condition of behavioral environment. This paper proposes following assumptions according to 
public choice theory, standing in the shoes of provincial government’s behavioral environment: 
1st. The assumption of economic man4;  
2nd. The assumption of limited rationality; 
3rd. The assumption of behavior consistency5; 
4th. The independence. 
 
2.2 Assumptions of the investor 
2.2.1  The investor is completely rational  
Among all the investors, the private investor and normal investor have explicit target that is to pursue 
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maximum profits, which is the essence of capital, in accordance with the characteristics of traditional 
capital output6. 
2.2.2  The Investor has expectations 
The investor will form the expectations directly towards current economic situation and government 
policy determinations according to their own experiences. 
2.2.3  Information 
The choice of the investor’s tactics and the responses towards government policy is different based on 
whether having complete information or not. 
 
3.  GAME PLAN ASSUMPTIONS OF BOTH GAME PLAYERS 
 
3.1 Construction of government competitive advantages and game plan 
There are four issues the provincial governments must be clear if they want to have discrepancy 
competitive advantages in the introduction of capital competitions7: First, under current circumstances, 
what competitive advantages does the province has when fighting against other provinces in attracting 
foreign investment? Second, what are the resources of the competitive advantages? Third, how long can 
this competitive advantages maintain? Fourth, how can the competitive advantage are built? At present, 
each province is attracting investment by its own advantages of power sources、geographical positions、
humane environment, etc. Under such fierce competition, above-mentioned issues need to be thorough 
analyzed and carried out before the introduction of investment. Only when these basic issues being 
sorted out, can the government control the competitive advantages, then obtain the investment. 
Under the game theory of using the investment, provincial government has optional tactics 
congregation, which is the way or method that can be chosen while making decisions. Within the central 
government’s authority scope, the factors of the influence to investor’s zone choice by provincial 
government, according to Ning Deng’s eclectic theory, can be divided into the natural endowment 
advantage and the investing environment advantage8. The natural endowment advantage, eg. local 
economic level of development、infrastructure condition、public institution serving quality、market scale 
and so on, belong to the local constraint conditions of resources endowment characteristics, which 
require relative long-term process of improvement, and cannot be treated as game plan. The latter means 
soft artificial environment which is primarily includes provincial government’s autonomous investment 
policy, etc. 
The choice of government tactics possesses not only autonomy but also biggish volatility and 
uncertainty. When the government determines to participate in the game of attracting foreign capital, the 
government’s function let iron the economic fluctuant manipulate against economic running, so the 
government will take certain measurements within reasonable scope when he figured out that it need 
outside driving force to promote and coordinate the economic development, which means the 
government will use its own competitive advantages to fight reasonably against other governments to 
attract the incoming of foreign capital, thereby to boost local economic development. While once the 
government feels that current local economics is under smooth condition, and the abrupt pouring of 
foreign capital may be doing harm to relative local economic development, or the local competitive 
advantages are not outstanding, the government will give up the compete, even will refuse the foreign 
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8 Gordon L Clark. The functional and spatial structure of the investment management industry (2000). Geoforum, 31 
(1):71-86 
Wang Keyi, Dong Liansheng/Management Science and Engineering 
Vol.2 No.1 2008 20-30 
 23
capital, such as increasing tax rate、raising land remising fee. Meanwhile, the government will make a 
full range of comparison among all the industries in its own scope of jurisdiction to choose pillar 
industries which can greatly support local development of economics and other aspects and the 
government will put forward more favorable strength to attract foreign capital for the pillar industries. 
This can benefit both game players, and reduce risk in the investment activity as well. 
In this paper, the discussing scope is limited in investment field, however the government has 
multivariate target as economics、 culture、 employment etc., and expect complete coordinating 
development in the province; while the investor’s ultimate goal can be conclude to maximum profit, 
therefore differences exist between the maximization of both sides. Nevertheless both game players can 
only coordinate the relationship between favorable policies (government cost), which is made by 
government who wants to attract investment, and the benefits of the investor (investor’s output) to 
realize the maximization. So the government is playing the game by constantly regulating the proportion 
of input and output. 
 
3.2 Game plan of the investor 
As the market competition become more and more fierce and the market development being multivariate 
and borderless, many investors start find new markets and manufacture fields with cost advantage9. After 
the investor determine whether to invest or not, the main consideration, while negotiating with the 
invested provincial government, is investment quality. Investment quality, which means the contribution 
degree made to local economics by executing the investment project. There are three primary measuring 
indexes: industrial structure optimization、technical progress and foreign trade. By whether establish 
R&D center and regional headquarters (RHQ) or not, can determine the local area has low or high added 
value on the industrial chain. 
The investment quality is a contractual arrangement for two stake-holders, the investor and 
provincial government and the investment quality determines the investor’s position in the negotiating 
with provincial government and the preferential degree of the stimulant policy provincial government 
gives. This is a mutual game process that both parties involved, both parties’ plan may be adjusted during 
the gaming , such as the investor’s sincerity in technical transfer、the establishment of the R&D 
institution and regional headquarters, undoubtedly, the stimulant policy provincial government issuing 
will change accordingly. Besides, whether the invested is pillar industry confirmed by provincial 
government also somehow determine the preferential degree of the given policy.  
 
4.   THE TARGET OF BOTH PLAYERS 
 
4.1 The target of provincial government 
Under the index exam mechanism, because of the multiple functions of the government in current 
economic society, the maximization target seems to have diversifying characteristic. However, viewing 
from some indexes in the exam mechanism, the primary sub-target is the economic increase aimed at 
maximum GDP or maximum growth rates. 
However, according to the abroad experiences and developing practice in China, the increase of GDP 
is not equivalent to economic development; an integrated index system should be used to measure the 
level of economic development. 
What needs to be further illustrated is that during the process of developing local economics, owing 
to the different stages of economic development, there are different predilections towards different 
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subjects in the total target system. GDP and some hard economic indexes are more important in the early 
period, and later the key point become the coordinating development of economics and society, 
including employment、welfares for low income people and ecological environment protection、
reasonable exploitation and utilization of resources10. The government’s needs of foreign investment 
differ according to different resource endowment. The provincial government with lower level of 
economic development is much more restricted by capital deficiency. Thereby the target of using foreign 
capital make up the gap of capital deficiency is being paid great attention to. With high level economic 
development, the provincial government is trying to pursue the quality of economic increase, 
emphasized on introducing advanced foreign techniques, the purpose of introducing capital is to 
promote local technology and enhance competitive power. 
The preferential policy supplied by provincial government to the investment activity is actually 
government costs and the more the allowance, the higher the costs. Therefore, provincial government 
will try to reduce the supply of the allowance, on premise of guaranteeing the development. Of course, 
the preferential policy supplied by provincial government is not only determined by natural endowment 
and economic development, but also in relation with the preferential policy supplied by competitive 
provincial government. 
 
4.2 The target of the investor 
The investment behavior can be seen as maximizing self benefits by finding out the optimum investment 
tactics under certain circumstance. But the target is diversify, which contains profit maximization and 
non-profit maximization, such as sales turnover maximization、long-term survive、satisfying profit、
CEO＇s personal target、social responsibility、growth and extension11. 
With economic development, the investor’s motivation presents to be multivariate, different types of 
investors have different specific motivation. However, no matter which kind of motivation, the purpose 
is the same, try to gain long-term integrated profits, essentially set the profit maximization as the final 
goal12. 
The essence of capital is to pursue profit maximization. In most economic models, normal 
assumption is that a CEO’s primary target is to maximize shareholder value. If choose a single target to 
make detailed illustration to interpret characteristics of the investor’s behavior, the choice have to be 
profit maximization. The plan made by the investor is dominatingly lying on analysis towards 
investment revenue-cost to maximize profits; supposing that benefits maximum is the only motivation 
and target for the investor’s behavior13. 
What the investors pursue is the maximum level of preferential policy supplied by government; the 
preferential policy is actually additional profits to the investor, the more favorable the policy being 
supplied, the higher profits the investor will get. As a result, the investor will take various measures 
pressing on government in order to higher the degree of preferential policy from government, and then 
realize the target of profit maximization. 
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5.  GAME RESEARCHES ON PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
INVESTOR 
 
5.1 Assumption of game function 
This paper simplifies the relationship between both game players as negotiating issue only between one 
provincial government and individual investor.  
Suppose
Ma as a sign of minimum favorable level supplied by government. If investor does not accept 
the government lowest supplying favorable level, there will have negotiation between provincial 
government and investor to obtain a higher level of investment preferential, under such condition, the 
preferential which the investor is hoping can be shown as
Na . Assume known probability )10( ≤≤ pp , 
this can reflect uncertainty of preferential condition supplied by provincial government, namely the 
preferential condition is floating between the minimum
Ma and the maximum Na . 
Suppose in the provincial strategic investment, social profit is ( )iB a , including government 
profit ( )iG a and investor profit ( )iE a . Here ' ( ) 0iB a ≥ , '' ( ) 0iB a < , ' ( ) 0iG a ≥ , '' ( ) 0iG a < , ' ( ) 0iE a ≥ , '' ( ) 0iE a < . 
Assume that to any given level of investment preferential, when come to terms, both sides’ total cost and 
marginal cost are all lower than the circumstance when protocol failed (according to Coase theorem)14. 
In the model of game theory, using ( )iCP a  to present project cost produced by investor in the plan i , 
using ( )iCE a  to present negotiation cost made by investor in plan i , using ( )iCG a  as a sign of 
negotiation cost made by government also in plan i , using CD( )ia as a sign of preferential policy cost 
produced by provincial government still in plan i . Suppose the cost advantage, which is reached under 
negotiation, means exist following conditions to all a :
M N( ) ( )CP a CP a> , ( ) ( )M NCE a CE a< , and 
M M N N( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CD a CG a CD a CG a+ < + , profit is ( ) ( )M NE a E a< , ( ) ( )M NG a G a> . The trends of various cost 
functions are shown in Figure2, suppose CD( )ia and ( )iCP a change in the linear way besides negotiation 
cost. 
The negotiation of both ( )iCG a  and ( )iCE a are all increasing with the increment of ia , that means 
with the carry out of preferential policy negotiation between government and investor, the negotiation 
will become more and more arduous, the cost will become heavier, the amplitude will definitely raise 
unceasingly. The preferential policy cost of CD( )ia will increase with the increment of ia , in other words, 
if the government supplies better preferential policy to investor, as reduction or exemption of tax、
reduction of land grant fee and so on to cause higher cost. Investor’s project cost ( )iCP a will reduce with 
the increment of
ia . Make curves fit of both costs, you can get cost curves of government and investor 
separately, shown in Figure 2. When both curves reach an intersection, the preferential policy produced 
is the equilibrium point *
Na . *Na  and Ma , which means preferential policy the government can supply, as 
well as 
Na , the hoping preferential policy of investor, the three variables’ position can determine whether 
the negotiation between government and investor will succeed or not, of course the government 
prefers *
Na  approach Ma  closely, while investor is hoping the *Na  approaches more closely to Na . The 
exact position of ia will be discussed in the following context. 
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Fig.1  The trends of cost change with
ia  
 
According to Figure 1, the negotiation of both the government ( )iCG a  and investor ( )iCE a are all 
increasing with the increment of
ia , that means with the carry out of preferential policy negotiation 
between government and investor, the negotiation will become more and more arduous, the cost will 
become heavier, the amplitude will definitely raises unceasingly. The preferential policy cost of the 
government CD( )ia will increase along with the increment of ia , in other words, if the government 
supplies better preferential policy to investor, as reduction or exemption of tax、reduction of land grant 
fee and so on to cause higher cost. Investor’s project cost ( )iCP a will reduce with the increment of ia . 
Make curves fit of both costs, you can get cost curves of government and investor separately, shown in 
Figure 1. When both curves reach an intersection, the preferential policy produced is the equilibrium 
point *
Na . *Na  and Ma , which means preferential policy the government can supply, as well as Na , the 
hoping preferential policy of investor, the three variables’ position can determine whether the 
negotiation between government and investor will succeed or not, of course the government prefers *
Na  
approach 
Ma  closely, while investor is hoping the *Na  approaches more closely to Na . The exact position 
of ia will be discussed in the following context.  
Suppose the net earnings of government, which under the circumstance of supplying lowest 
preferential level, is presented by
M( )NSG a , while the net earnings of investor is presented as M( )NSE a , 
they can be signified separately as 
M M M( ) ( ) C ( ) C ( )MNSG a G a D a G a= − − , M M M( ) ( ) C ( ) C ( )MNSE a E a P a E a= − − . Likewise, if the investor 
does not accept the lowest investment favorable level and then resorts to negotiation, the government 
will supply higher level of favorable in order not to lose investor, suppose this time, the preferential 
policy level is 'a , 'a can make the social net earnings, which described as ' ' '( ) ( ) ( )NSB a NSE a NSG a= + , 
to reach maximum. If 'a is replaced by *
Na , to indicate the optimal solution, the first-order condition can 
be met: 
' * ' * * * * * * *( ) ( ) C ( ) C ( ) C ( ) C ( ) 0N N N N N NG a E a D a G a P a E a+ − − − − =      (1) 
Under such situation, in which the target assumption is given, *
Na  is the investment preferential level 
that can make the social net earnings maximum, the society will get net payback equals to *( )NNSB a , 
owing to the probability of successful negotiation, which is between provincial government and investor 
pointing against investment favorable level, is p, for the social expectation to net payback is *p ( )NNSB a , 
Favorable policy
Cost
Investor cost
Government cost
aM aNa*N
( )iCP a
( )iCE a
( )iCG a
CD( )ia
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*
Na  as well can maximize this expression. 
If the provincial government and investor can reach an agreement on minimum investment favorable 
level, investor’s cost is
MC ( ) C ( )MP a E a+ . On the contrary, if there is no agreement on this matter, the 
government and investor will continue to negotiate for a higher preferential level, In general particular, 
investor’s expecting cost is * *[C ( ) C ( )]N Np P a E a+ . Pay attention to this assumption that investor will choose 
this provincial government to be his cooperative partner. 
In the Figure 2, the decision tree summarizes the event results, by ( )iB a , the social benefits, as the 
standard, node means decision maker (G=government, E=investor) as well as profits circumstance of 
both provincial government and investor under possible condition. The decision tree indicates these two 
basic policies: 
(1) Government decides whether to supply minimum investment favorable level
Ma or not; 
(2) Investor determines whether to accept such level or not. 
If the government proposed a investment favorable level,
Mia a= , investor will not accept such 
preferential level if and only if under such circumstance, investor’s expecting cost is lower (or at least 
not higher) than the cost which is under the circumstance of highest investment favorable level, that 
means if and only if: 
* *
M M( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]N NCP a CE a p CP a CE a+ ≤ +      (2) 
Or, with the premise of assuming investor’s project cost function 
i( )CP a and negotiation cost 
function 
i( )CE a have same linear relationship, the following expression can be transformed: 
*
MM N NC a pC a≤      (3) 
Under the circumstance of given p as well as cost parameter, expression (3) determines the 
maximum max
Ma , which is the minimum investment favorable level Ma  that investor is willing to accept, it 
can be presented by  
max *N
N
M
Cp
CM
a a=      (4) 
 
Fig. 2  The decision tree of regulator and firm 
p 1-p
Not accept Accept
Not supplyaM SupplyaM
G
E E
G: NSG(a1)
E: NSE(a1)
G:  0
E:  0
p 1-p
G
G: NSG(a2)
E: NSE(a2)
G:  0
E:  0
G: NSG(aM)
E: NSE(aM)
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max
Ma  is increased along with the increase of p. The probability that investors accept lowest investment 
favorable level will be change because of the change of p. The probability of max *
NMa a>  couldn’t be 
exclude because costs of investors are not definite along with the changing of 
ia , i( )CP a  is reduced 
along with the increase of 
ia  which means investment preferential, but i( )CE a  is increased along with 
the increase of 
ia . 
( )iG a ,which means governmental profit is reduced along with the increase of ia , ( )iE a  which means 
profit of investors is increased along with the increase of 
ia , so magnitude of ( )iB a  which means social 
profit is not definite along with the change of 
ia . When social profit in the lowest investment preferential 
condition is not less than it in the condition of prospective highest investment favorable, both parties 
involved are possible to accept lowest investment preferential level. 
*
MNSB( ) pNSB( )Na a≥      (5) 
This condition implies interval min 0( , )M Ma a  of Ma , government tends to lowest investment preferential 
level in this interval, in which it may be considered min
Ma = Ma , namely government can supply the 
minimum value of the favorable policy. Figure 3 show the interval, in which min
Ma  means the low limit of 
the interval, namely government supplies the minimum value of investment preferential level, 0
Ma  means 
upper limit of the interval, which is the investment preferential minimum value that provincial 
government provides. Furthermore, *
Ma  is also in this interval, in which *Ma  is the optimum level for Ma , 
namely the level makes 
MNSB( )a  biggest. Therefore, single-order condition is solved 
' * * * * * *( ) C ( ) C ( ) C ( ) C ( ) 0M M M MB a D a G a P a E a− − − − =      (6) 
When the negotiation between government and investor succeeds, *
Na  should be in this interval, and  
* *
N Ma a> , then 0 * * minM N M Ma a a a> > >      (7) 
 
5.2 The balanced result of Game theory 
As Figure 3 shows the behavioral description of provincial government and investor which is in front 
indicates necessary and sufficient condition in which investment favorable level makes balance in 
optimum behavior condition 
max 0
M Ma a≤      (8) 
Namely highest value of the investment favorable policy that provincial government provides is not 
less than the highest value of 
Ma  which investors will accept. When it lacks the menace of losing the 
chance of investing, lowest investment preferential level can not be the balanced result. Therefore, what 
makes investment preferential level possible is just about the menace of losing the chance of investing.  
It also indicates that the menace of losing the chance of investing is sufficient condition of the 
balanced result. Specially, max 0
M Ma a≤  namely the follow points can be made to any 0p >  with (8): the 
balanced result of Game theory is lowest investment preferential level that government supplies and 
investors can accept.  
The point indicates possible cost saving brings the potential which makes both sides advantaged, 
namely achieves “win-win”. If both sides adopt optimum behavior, the potential will be found in the 
balance. 
This perspective makes sure the existence of 
Ma that both sides can accept, namely scope of 
reciprocal agreement. However, does not fix balanced level of
Ma , this all up to the result of negotiation 
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which is between provincial government and investor. Nevertheless, according to following context, 
both sides’ bargain ability effect not only voluntary agreement on profits distribution, but also 
effectiveness of investment preferential level. As a result, this paper takes consideration about bargain 
ability for three situations: Provincial government possesses absolute bargain ability; Investor possesses 
absolute bargain ability; both sides share the profits. 
When the provincial government possesses complete bargain ability, it can supply the choice “Accept 
or not” for investor, so as to make profits to reach the maximum under constraint of expression (8). 
Under this assumption, relatives to the following two situations, there are two equilibriums which are 
possible: 
min * max
M M Ma a a< <      (9) 
min max *
M M Ma a a< <      (10) 
The equilibrium (9). In this situation, any value of 
Ma  as long as satisfied min maxM M Ma a a< < , for both 
sides are all willing to choose minimum favorable level. Thereby, *
Ma can meet this condition along with 
maximum of
M( )NSB a , provincial government will supply *Ma (investor will accept). Above all, the 
consequence of equilibrium is a proposal with minimum investment preferential level. 
The equilibrium (10). Because *
Ma  does not belong to the interval between minMa and maxMa , if the 
provincial government supply *
Ma , investor will refuse and reach the result of back maximum investment 
favorable level. Therefore, it is better for provincial government to supply the level max
Ma to produce a 
higher investment level. Take notice of what is necessary for attracting investor to accept, which is 
nothing but higher level of investment preferential. Yet, due to the possible that max
Ma may be bigger or 
smaller than *
Na , it is high or low is primarily up to the value of p. Let us summarize all the above with 
following perspectives. 
(1) If the government possesses absolute bargain ability, this time the result of equilibrium may be a 
proposal with optimal investment favorable level, although might not guarantee optimal level. 
(2) If the equilibrium result is optimal one, the social net earnings, which is under such minimum 
investment favorable level, is beyond the level of maximum investment favorable, which means 
“beyond abide by”. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 The scale of
Ma by regulator 
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When the investor possesses absolute bargain ability, investor will supply proposal to gain complete 
profits (Actually, investor enforce government to decide whether to accept or not). Apparently, the 
consequence of bargain is max
Ma , connected with max * *M N Ma a a> >  can reach following perspectives: 
If investor possesses absolute bargain ability, there will not be optimal result from equilibrium point. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium result is like this, investment favorable level is higher than optimal 
investment preferential level under such circumstance, also higher than maximum investment favorable 
level. We can see clearly from all above, while both sides want to share their profits (such as under Nash 
equilibrium), in the first equilibrium, the level will between min
Ma and *Ma . In the second equilibrium, the 
level will between min
Ma and maxMa . 
 
6.   CONCLUSION 
 
This paper adopts the method of game theory, emphasizes on model analysis, which is related to benefits 
coordination and relationship between government and investor in the investment management. Paper 
establishes game model of provincial strategic investment management, which including the 
assumptions, strategies, objectives as well as detailed analysis of profits functions of the two players, 
government and investor, and then make conclusion of game theory: take cost factor into consideration, 
the provincial government take advantage of investor’s benefits marginally reduce along with the 
increment of investment dimension; under the circumstance of without considering other factors or equal 
factors, the more favorable stimulating policy government supply, the higher of the marginal benefits 
rate for investor, the bigger of the investment dimension, the higher level of benefits in game theory. 
Being constrained by author’s energy and objective condition, there are still following insufficient 
aspects in researches: 
1st.  In the process of establishing game model, it is mentioned that three relationship exist, namely 
game theory between provincial governments, game theory between investors as well as the last one 
between government and investor, this paper only pays great attention to the last situation and carries out 
deeply discussion, besides, simplifies this relationship into game theory’s relationship just between only 
one government and one investor. In reality, the existence of other two relationships would affect the last 
relationship to a certain degree, need to be further discussed so as to reach a kind of perfect establishment 
of game model. 
2nd.  In the game model established by this paper, does not think over other ways of investment by 
government. Therefore, this question can be raised, in other words, whether the government would take 
measures of (or under certain circumstance) “carrot” and “big stick” manner, through subsidy to partial 
or global cost produced by investor to lure investor take participate in the minimum investment favorable 
level. This requires further refinement. 
 
 
